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Spanning Boundaries in an Arizona Watershed Partnership: Information
Networks as Tools for Entrenchment or Ties for Collaboration?
Tischa A. Muñoz-Erickson 1, Bethany B. Cutts 2,3, Elisabeth K. Larson 2, Kate J. Darby 4, Mark Neff 5,
Amber Wutich 4, and Bob Bolin 4

ABSTRACT. The need to develop successful collaborative strategies is an enduring problem in sustainable
resource management. Our goal is to evaluate the relationship between information networks and conflict
in the context of collaborative groundwater management in the rapidly growing central highland region of
Arizona. In this region, water-management conflicts have emerged because of stakeholders’ differing
geographic perspectives and competing scientific claims. Using social network analyses, we explored the
extent to which the Verde River Basin Partnership (VRBP), which was charged with developing and sharing
scientific information, has contributed to collaboration in the region. To accomplish this, we examined the
role that this stakeholder partnership plays in reinforcing or overcoming the geographic, ideological, expert,
and power conflicts among its members. Focusing on information sharing, we tested the extent to which
several theoretically important elements of successful collaboration were evidenced by data from the VRBP.
The structure of information sharing provides insight into ways in which barriers between diverse
perspectives might be retained and elucidates weaknesses in the partnership. To characterize information
sharing, we examined interaction ties among individuals with different geographic concerns, hierarchical
scales of interest, belief systems (about science, the environment, and the role of the partnership), and selfidentified expertise types. Results showed that the partnership’s information-sharing network spans most
of these boundaries. Based on current theories of collaboration, we would expect the partnership network
to be conducive to collaboration. We found that information exchanges are limited by differences in
connection patterns across actor expertise and environmental-belief systems. Actors who view scientists
as advocates are significantly more likely to occupy boundary-spanning positions, that appear to impede
the success of the partnership. This analysis challenges widely held assumptions about the properties that
separate successful collaborations from those that are less successful. It has implications for our
understanding of the factors that constrain information processing, knowledge production, and collectiveaction capability in institutions.
Key Words: Arizona; boundary spanning; collaborative management; environmental governance;
information networks; power; water management

INTRODUCTION
Watershed partnerships are increasingly common
in natural resource management. Also known as
councils, committees, and advisory groups, these
partnerships offer an organizational forum in which
multiple policy stakeholders, including environmental
groups, local landowners, government agencies,
and concerned citizens, can come together to discuss
and negotiate watershed management plans
1

(Cortner and Moote 1999, Leach and Pelkey 2001).
Collaboration is a flexible policy tool for addressing
environmental impacts in a cost-effective manner
(Lubell et al. 2002). At their best, partnerships
provide inclusive and creative ways to reach
consensus on acceptable policies, and develop the
information, trust, and social capital necessary to
foster mutual learning (Galaskiewicz 1985, Cortner
and Moote 1999, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). Often,
improved communication and information exchange
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lead to better environmental and political literacy
for all parties (Ostrom 1990, Hardy et al. 2003) and
can potentially foster adaptive capacity across the
various levels of governance involved (Olsson et al.
2004, Armitage 2005). By including a wide range
of participants, collaborative decisions are able to
draw from wider resources, reduce decision making
uncertainty, enhance decision legitimacy, and more
effectively attain collective goals (Galaskiewicz
1985, Ostrom 1990, Prell et al. 2008).
Yet, despite the growing literature documenting the
benefits and successes of watershed partnerships
and collaborative management in general
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Sabatier et al. 2005)
success is far from guaranteed. In central Arizona,
for example, the Verde River Basin Partnership
(VRBP) was created by federal legislation in 2005
to develop and share scientific information to
inform watershed management in the Central
Highlands region with the intent of alleviating
controversy over water management in the region
(Northern Arizona Land Exchange and Verde River
Basin Partnership Act 2005). Despite Congress’s
intent and the VRBP’s collaborative mandate, the
group continues to face numerous obstacles because
of conflicts between upstream and downstream
interests groups over groundwater withdrawals
(Bolin et al. 2008).
The southwestern United States is an arid region
with a rapidly growing population, and water
politics has long been central to local and regional
politics (Worster 1985, Reisner 1993, Hirt et al
2008). The Colorado River, which drains parts of
seven U.S. states and two Mexican ones, is the main
source of surface water for much of the region.
Groundwater use has complemented surface water
resources to accommodate population growth and
widespread agriculture. However, heavy reliance on
groundwater is unsustainable in the region, because
of incredibly long recharge times and local
problems with ground-level subsidence (Jenkins
2006). In 1980, Arizona enacted the Groundwater
Management Act (GMA) with the intent of ending
unsustainable groundwater withdrawal by 2025 by
placing restrictions on groundwater use in the most
populous and rapidly growing parts of the state,
areas termed “Active Management Areas” (Fig. 1)
by the law. Passing the law secured California’s
support in Congress for the Central Arizona Project
(CAP), a canal to bring Colorado River water to the
population centers of Arizona (Reisner 1993, Hirt
et al 2008).

The site of our case study, the Prescott Active
Management Area (PrAMA), is one of five
currently designated Active Management Areas in
Arizona. For the Phoenix AMA, the CAP canal and
other local rivers (Salt and Verde) make the goal of
ending net groundwater withdrawal by 2025
comparatively attainable. However, the PrAMA
does not have substantial surface water, nor does it
currently have a means for Colorado River water
delivery. The region also continues to face rapid
growth, with an estimated 3% population increase
per year (Collins and Bolin 2007).
Because of its lack of other water sources, the
PrAMA received the only exception in the GMA
that allows it to import groundwater from outside
the AMA. This exemption created a host of
transboundary issues and placed significant
importance on the legal distinction between
groundwater and surface water. These two forms of
water, although legally distinct, may or not be
physically linked, and controversies abound over
the impact of groundwater withdrawal on surface
waters of the Verde River and the downstream
biological and human communities that depend on
it outside of the PrAMA. Downstream communities,
including civil-society groups, municipal, federal,
state, and county government agencies (Fig. 2) have
disputed the plans to transfer groundwater and, in
some cases, threatened with legal action based on
scientific evidence that the transferring groundwater
will negatively affect surface water. Those in favor
of the groundwater transfer similarly mobilize
scientific evidence to support their claims. As
depicted in Fig. 2, the VRBP was developed as a
forum for communication across interests with the
intention of identifying questions for which
additional scientific information on the hydrological
and ecological impacts of the water transfer might
help generate mutually agreeable management
options (Northern Arizona Land Exchange and
Verde River Basin Partnership Act 2005).
Nonetheless, conflict persists, and after the initial
meetings of the VRBP, several of the upstream
municipal and county representatives left the group
because they perceived inequities in the voting
structure.
Several factors could explain why conflict persists
in watershed partnerships such as the VRBP. The
policy and organizational literature posits that
collaboration may be inhibited by deeply
entrenched political interests that are not amenable
to resolution, by lack of trust, by lack of alternative
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Fig. 1. Map of the case study.

Note: Red boundaries indicate Arizona active management areas (AMAs). The picture to the right
shows the Prescott Active Management Area (PrAMA) within the red boundary, the proposed Big
Chino Pipeline and Aqueduct, and the downstream communities along the Verde River.

management options, and by a constricting external
institutional structure (Leach and Pelkey 2001,
Manring 2007). Recent analysis carried out on
political conflict in the central Arizona region reveal
that, rather than reaching consensus, stakeholders
mobilize scalar arguments (Bolin et al. 2008) and
use competing scientific claims to bolster their
ideological and policy preferences. Specifically, a
dispute over scientific information connecting
groundwater to surface water is seen by some as the
central issue fueling political conflict (O’Halleran,
personal communication). Although information
sharing is considered a critical resource for
increasing a partnership’s learning capacities
(Manring 2007), little attention has been paid to how
the use and sharing of information, that is, the flow
of information through a partnership’s network,
affects how collaboration works and whether it
succeeds in minimizing resource management
conflict.

We seek to evaluate the relationship between
information networks and conflict in the context of
collaborative groundwater management and the
VRBP in central Arizona. Specifically, we use the
tools of social network analysis to explore how the
VRBP’s information network facilitates or limits
stakeholders’ capacity to bridge the ideological and
geographical boundaries that permeate this
partnership.
Social network theory suggests numerous ways that
network structure or, more specifically, the
relationships or ties among network units called
nodes or actors (e.g., people, websites,
organizations) can influence organizational
outcomes (e.g., Provan and Milward 1995).
Recently, network analysis has been used to
evaluate power distribution and cooperation in
regional and water-related partnerships across
multiple policy levels (Henry 2007, Berardo 2009).
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Fig. 2.. Conceptual model depicting the diverse set of political groups with interests in the Verde region
and the Big Chino Water Project.

Note: The axes represent where each group and alliances align themselves in respect to their vertical
and horizontal interests.

For instance, Schneider et al. (2003) demonstrate
that successful partnerships, in comparison to
noncollaborative management approaches, are able
to span multiple geographic, ideological, and
expertise boundaries and, therefore, be more
effective at collective decision making.
We propose that applying network analysis to
understand how a partnership’s information
network influences its ability to span multiple

internal boundaries and power differences provides
insight into the functioning of collaborative
organizations and the role of information sharing as
a source of conflict, insights that are not evident
through other methodologies. In conducting this
research, we address recent calls in this journal to
apply a network perspective to understand structural
effects on collaborative approaches to natural
resource management (Bodin et al. 2007).
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Boundary Spanning and Power in
Collaborative Information Networks
Understanding the structural relationships of
partnerships through social network analysis can
help determine the role that information exchange
networks may play in promoting, and/or inhibiting
collaboration (Hardy et al. 2003). For example, it
can help identify if asymmetries of information flow
and use of science exist, and if these asymmetries
create barriers to collaboration. As Tilt et al. (2008)
found in a survey of 125 collaborative groups in the
western U.S., ideological conflicts are often
surmountable barriers to progress, but conflict over
issues of fact or information can incapacitate the
process. These conflicts may occur by
marginalizing nonscientist participants (Koontz et
al. 2004) or by privileging “expert” knowledge over
other types of knowledge (Brunner et al. 2005).
Complementary to the collaborative management
literature, social network theory suggests that tight
network connections within a perspective, but not
across perspectives, often indicate a source of
conflict. Dense ties within a perspective suggest
homophily, or the tendency of people to affiliate
with those who have similar ideas. When there is
evidence that a particular perspective or
characteristic of the respondents corresponds with
tie frequency, then we might surmise that
homophily plays a prominent role in conflict (e.g.,
Shutters and Cutts 2008). Similarly, social network
methods can illuminate power differences through
measures of centrality that relate to how many ties
an individual has (in the case of degree centrality)
and how many unique groups are only connected
through that individual (“betweenness centrality”).
In other words, social network structure can either
benefit or obstruct the goals of collaboration.
Network connections can allow access to diverse
and dispersed knowledge (Wegner 1987, Moreland
et al 1996, Rulke and Galaskiewiscz 2000) and
decrease levels of internal conflict. On the other
hand, this often leads to a homogenous belief system
(Krackhardt and Stern 1988, Ibarra 1992, Reagans
and Zuckerman 2001). When these homogenous
beliefs foster polarized “us versus them” mentalities
between groups of actors within a partnership,
conflict can become deeply entrenched (Krackhardt
and Stern 1988). If homophily is structuring
relationships, we would expect to see more withingroup ties than between-group ties within the VRBP
(Fig. 3). If access to diverse and dispersed
knowledges is a priority of groups within the

network, then the network might exhibit higher
frequencies of between-group ties in statistical
pairwise comparisons.
Social network analysis is an appropriate tool to
evaluate water-related partnerships, especially
because natural components of hydrological
systems rarely restrict themselves to governance at
a single scale. Previous authors have applied a
social-network approach to examine the nature of
ties across vertical, horizontal, expertise, and
ideological boundaries, arguing that spanning these
boundaries make partnerships more effective at
collaborative management (Schneider et al. 2003).
These authors relate vertical position to levels of
government, horizontal position to geographic
jurisdiction, expertise position to scientific training
and ideological position to views underlying issue
positions. Following their approach, we hypothesize
that conflict persists because information-sharing
links within the network do not span vertical,
horizontal, expertise, and/or ideological boundaries.
Boundary spanning hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a (H1a)
Conflict persists because of vertical stratification:
When different levels of political concern are
linked, partnerships are able to advance
perspectives that consider political priorities at
those multiple scales from national to local and
initiate action at the levels that are most appropriate
and effective (Schneider et al. 2003, Collins and
Bolin 2007). If vertical stratification perpetuates
conflict, than we would expect that network ties will
be denser within a vertical layer than across vertical
layers.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b)
Conflict persists because of horizontal stratification:
Successful partnerships are able to bridge
boundaries between horizontally stratified interests.
The VRBP was initially intended to straddle
upstream and downstream interests. Many of the
upstream interests are no longer part of the
partnership, so our ability to examine the horizontal
span of the network is constrained. If horizontal
stratification perpetuates conflict, then we would
expect that network ties will be denser within
horizontal boundaries than across horizontal
boundaries.
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Fig. 3. Simplified examples of social networks.

Note: Actors are represented by shapes and ties as the arrows between them. The type of shape (circle or
square) separates the actors into groups based on the attributes of interest (e.g., expertise or ideology). In
(A), groups exhibit strong homophily, with more within-group ties than between-group ties. In (B),
within-group ties do not significantly outnumber between-group ties, resulting in more opportunities for
interaction among groups.

Hypothesis 1c (H1c)
Conflict persists because of ideological differences:
Social network theory suggests that tight cliques of
individuals or organizations with similar perspectives
to one another, but very different perspectives
across groups might indicate a primary source of
conflict. We operationalize this by examining: (1)
environmental values, measured via the New
Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap et al. 2000), (2)

differing perceptions about where the biggest
barriers to decision making occur in this particular
context (Marshall et al. 2007), (3) differing views
on the objectivity of science (positivism; as
discussed in Steel et al. 2004), (4) differing views
on the role of scientists as activists (Steel et al. 2004),
and (5) political ideology. If ideology along these
axes conserves conflict, then we would expect that
network ties will be denser within an ideology than
across ideologies.
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Hypothesis 1d (H1d)

Hypothesis 2a (H2a)

Conflict persists because of inadequate communication
between experts and non-experts: Actors in decision
making in the United States frequently cite technical
reasons for their preferred policy outcomes
(Jasanoff 1990). News reports and previous
interviews confirm that the controversy in this case
is similarly argued in technical terms (Bolin et al.
2008, O’Halleran, personal communication). Thus,
we can hypothesize that the controversy remains
intractable because of inadequate connections
between those who have access to, and
understanding of, the technical aspects of this
debate. If expertise boundaries perpetuate conflict,
then we would expect that network ties will be
denser within an expertise type than across expertise
types.

In-degree centrality will not vary significantly with
vertical, horizontal, expertise, or ideological
position: Measures of in-degree centrality and
betweenness centrality are most relevant to our
research. In-degree centrality, measured by
connections from others to a node, indicates prestige
(Knoke and Burt 1983, Brass and Burkhardt 1993),
and is robust to response rates lower than 100%
(Costenbader and Valente 2003). These individuals
are objects, and not necessarily sources, of
communication (Knoke and Burt 1983). Correspondence
between traits of actors (in H1a-d) and in-degree
centrality indicates perceptions of power by other
members of the network. If we find, for example,
that that actors who think that scientists should not
act as decision makers hold central positions, then
conflict might be more likely to persist.

Power hypotheses
Hypothesis 2b (H2b)
Power asymmetries in networks often promote
conflict (Brass et al. 2004), whereas collaboration
most frequently persists when power is equally
distributed (Ostrom 1990). From previous research,
we know that citizen-activist groups in the central
Arizona highlands have appealed to larger
geographic and political scales in attempts to
increase their power (Bolin et al. 2008). We do not
know how effective this has been at moving them
to a greater position of power within the VRBP.
Given the constraints of the study, we cannot test
this directly though empirical methods. However,
we can use a combination of descriptive statistics
and hypothesis testing methods to investigate how
differences in power are distributed and conjecture
about implications this might have for the network.
Although it is not the only source of power, network
position can determine the amount of influence
individuals have over information dispersal (Ibarra
1993). Central actors may determine the type of
knowledge that is generated in the network as their
beliefs and prior knowledge influence how useful,
relevant, and reliable is the information they have
access to (Davy 2006, Choo Wei 2007). We expect
that the extent of power differentials in how
information is accessed and used in the network will
influence cooperation. Network characteristics can
be used to identify people in positions of power
(Brass and Burkhardt 1993, Ibarra 1993, Brass et al.
2004).

Betweenness centrality will not vary significantly
with vertical, horizontal, expertise, or ideological
position: Betweenness centrality, also sometimes
called brokerage (e.g., Bodin et al. 2005), is also
relevant to our concerns. Betweenness-centrality
calculations are based on the number of times an
actor falls on the “shortest pathway” between two
other actors and has been used to measure control
over resources and indicates power over
information gatekeeping (Brass and Burkhardt
1993). Correspondence between traits of actors (in
Hypotheses 1a-d) and betweenness centrality
indicates information bridges in network. If the
results indicate a particular trait is associated with
higher betweenness centrality, then they may be
limiting the potential for consensus by restricting
information flow. If they support a perspective that
is not popular, they exaggerate the extent to which
it has permeated groups for whom there are few
other regular sources of information.
Either high in-degree or high betweenness centrality
means that the actor can act as an information
gatekeeper, facilitating information transfer he or
she views as helpful, and preventing information he
or she views as counterproductive from being
widely dispersed to their contacts. In networks with
distributed power, this is less problematic, as there
are alternative pathways to allow for information
transfer (Bodin et al. 2006). The relative evenness
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of power distribution within a network can be
assessed by calculating network centralization
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
Case Study: Big Chino Water Conflict and the
Verde River Basin Partnership
The lack of surface water, coupled with population
growth in the region, has pushed PrAMA’s search
for water outside of the AMA boundaries. The most
visible current proposal, the Big Chino Project
(BCP), a pipeline that would pump groundwater
from the Big Chino aquifer, 48 km (30 miles) north
of the PrAMA (Barks 2007). Residents outside of
municipal water systems rely on 27,000 “exempt”
wells that are not regulated under the GMA. The
PrAMA still primarily relies on water from the Little
Chino aquifer, which some believe will be depleted
in 130 yrs (Collins and Bolin 2007). Controversies
over scientific information specifically revolve
around whether the Big Chino and Little Chino
aquifers, the source of water for the BCP and
PRAMA, are connected to the headwaters of the
Verde River, thus potentially affecting surface
flows of the river and the wildlife and downstream
users dependent on it. Several reports, including two
issued by the United States Geological Survey,
suggest that pumping the Big Chino aquifer will
draw down the Verde River (Wirt et al. 2004,
Langenheim et al. 2005). However, other reports
have pointed out that uncertainties exist over
whether changes in groundwater levels because of
historic or current pumping in the shallow aquifers
(McGavock 2003). These reports have become tools
in the political struggle, pitting the different interests
against each other, specifically those representing
upstream and downstream interests (Bolin et al.
2008).
The Verde River Basin Partnership (http://www.ve
rderiverbasinpartnership.org/) was created by
federal mandate through Title II of Public Law
109-110, in which it is “...collaborative and sciencebased water resource planning and management
partnership for the Verde River Basin in the State
of Arizona, consisting of members that represent (1)
federal, state, and local agencies; and (2) economic,
environmental, and community water interests in
the Verde River Basin.” The group is tasked with
an action item: identify “long-term water supply
management options for communities and water
resources within the Verde River Basin and
[complete] water resource analyses and monitoring

needed to support the implementation of
management options.” Specifically, the partnership
is required to submit a final report to the United
States Department of Agriculture and Governor of
Arizona that includes a summary of the results of
water resource assessments, as well as identification
of areas in the Verde River Basin that are determined
to have groundwater deficits or other current or
potential water supply problems, long-term water
supply management options, and resource analysis
and monitoring needed to support the implementation
of management strategies.
Although the partnership’s goals are to gather and
generate science-based information, and not to
decide on specific management strategies, some of
the upstream interests, specifically the major cities
within the PrAMA, have contested the role of the
partnership in the larger institutional context
(McNulty 2008, personal observation). Because the
partnership allowed participation by civil-society
groups, whose representatives are not part of formal
democratic processes, several of the PrAMA
community members withdrew from the partnership
and formed the Upper Verde Watershed Protection
Coalition. In response, the partnership and its major
state supporters, including Senator John McCain,
have tried to convince the PrAMA members that it
is in their benefit to join the VRBP and have cited
the success of the Upper San Pedro Partnership
(USPP) in southern Arizona as a successful
collaboration model for VRBP. The USSP was
formed to address concerns about the sustainability
of the San Pedro River region in southern Arizona,
and generate collaboration among multiple
stakeholders to produce knowledge on the relative
impacts of water uses on stream flow and to design
strategies for conserving water. This research has
been successful in helping assess the water budget
for the rivers by local municipal, industrial, and
agricultural users and generating management
strategies for implementation (Browning-Aiken et
al 2004). The extent to which the VRBP can be
modeled according to the USPP is questionable,
given that in the latter there is an agreed-upon goal
within the partnership and most debates over
scientific information have been resolved,
conditions that do not hold similarly in our case
study.
In light of these disagreements, we analyze the
function of the VRBP as an information and sciencecoordinating body, as opposed to a policyproducing body. The short duration of the VRBP (2
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yrs) lends itself to an analysis of the role that this
information network plays as a crucial precondition
for building co-operative institutions, and as a
baseline for examining its effects on policy
formation in the future.

times over six weeks, we provided email and/or
telephone reminders to nonrespondents. After six
weeks, we sent a hard copy of the survey to
remaining nonrespondents.
Analysis

METHODS
Data Collection
Our survey instrument includes a social network
component, an affiliation and identity component,
and a worldview component (See Appendix 1). It
draws from a diverse arrangement of previously
validated survey questions that use and “strongly
agree” to “strongly disagree” scales to represent
complicated underlying constructs. These include
summative scales developed to assess ascription to
the New Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap et al.
2000), views of science and the role of scientists in
policy formation (Steel et al. 2004), and perceptions
of dominant barriers to achieving the VRBP’s
objectives (Marshall et al. 2007). It also includes a
single item to assess political ideology (General
Social Survey 2006). The political ideology (Liberal
to Conservative) question is a highly reliable and
valid measure, taken from the General Social
Survey administered throughout the United States.
Conservative ideology generally emphasizes
empowerment of the individual, whereas Liberal
ideology generally emphasizes the responsibility of
government. We used organizational affiliation, job
title, and identity questions to determine vertical,
horizontal, and expertise characteristics for each
individual in the sample frame.
Sampling Procedure
Because the sampling frame used in whole network
studies can have tremendous consequences for the
outcomes (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Provan et
al. 2007), we used the list of attendees from the first
VRBP meeting, inviting all 42 members from the
list to participate. To determine the sufficiency of
this sampling frame at capturing the dominant
interactions regarding the VRBP, we allowed
respondents to free-list others with whom they
routinely shared Big Chino-related information.
Following Dillman's Tailored Design Method
(2000), we implemented a multimodal (paper and
internet) survey design, contacting potential
respondents multiple times. Approximately three

We used SPSS v.15.0 (2001) to calculate descriptive
statistics using survey responses and to test the
validity of item scales using principle component
analysis. Because our sample size was small, none
of the item scales (New Environmental Paradigm,
views of science, role of scientists as role of
scientists in policy formation, and perceptions of
dominant barriers to achieving the VRBPs
objectives) resulted in a single factor. As an
alternative, we used responses to construct binary
categories for each of these world view components
as well as the political ideology question.
We used the “frequent interaction” graph for social
network analysis of information sharing. This graph
represents ties between individuals who interact
with one another at least weekly. From this graph,
we calculated centrality measures for each actor
using UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002). We calculated
in-degree centrality and betweenness centrality to
use as measure of power (Brass and Burkhardt 1993)
and information brokerage (Chan and Liebowitz
2006), respectively. We did not assume that all
reported ties were reciprocated because we were
interested in capturing differences between in
perception of links (Krackhardt 1987, Ibarra 1993).
We used survey responses and the network in
tandem to test our hypotheses using three network
hypothesis-testing methods.
Actor connections to those with similar knowledge
and/or attitudes can be quantified in a variety of
ways. Least stringently, joint-count contingency
tables can be used to determine whether or not there
is a significant difference in number of ties among
groups. More conservatively, structural-block
UCINET ANOVA models can be used to identify
difference in ties between and across perspectives.
Using relational-contingency analysis, we tested
whether or not there was a difference in the number
of ties within perspectives versus across
perspectives. This test is a global test for difference
in tie distribution (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
Next, we used more specific tests of homophily for
each perspective outlined in hypotheses H1a to H1d.
We also used a structural-block model to look for
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more specific patterns of difference between withinperspective and among-perspectives ties. This is an
ANOVA density model. It tests for differences in
the pattern of within-perspective and amongperspectives ties by each characteristic. It does not
specify a direction of difference. The statistical test
can tell us if some groups are more likely to reach
out to other groups or if others are more likely to be
insular.
To determine whether or not particular network
positions affiliated with power were more likely to
be filled by actors with particular characteristics, we
used the UCINET ANOVA test. UCINET's
hypothesis-testing algorithms include bootstrap
routines to overcome the problem of sample
nonindependence (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
The social network information for our work has
been collected using a survey methodology that
relies on recognition, that is, selecting names
provided, rather than recall. Because of this, there
are two major limitations: (1) some nodes may overreport their ties, and (2) not all ties reported are
reciprocal. Accommodating these limitations in
interpretations is fairly straightforward. By
focusing on in-degree centrality as an indicator of
power, we can limit the effect of an individual’s
tendency to over-report tie strength. It also makes
it possible to capture at least some of the power of
the nonrespondents. The study is one of people’s
perspectives on their interrelation, which is often as
influential, if not more influential, than their actual
interrelations (Marsden 1990, Gunther and Story
2003).
RESULTS
Thirty one out of 42 (73.8%) of potential survey
respondents completed the Big Chino Project
Survey between November 2007 and January 2008.
Participants reported being involved with issues
pertinent to the proposed Big Chino Water Ranch
for between 2 and 28 yrs with an average of 7.8
(standard deviation: 5.5). Metrics for the whole
network indicate a density of 0.056, and in-degree
network centralization of 0.19 (Fig. 4).
Within the whole network, diverse vertical,
horizontal, expertise, and ideological perspectives
are represented (Table 1). Six vertical levels are
represented, with watershed-level interests being
most commonly represented. Horizontally, downstream

interests are represented twice as frequently as
upstream interests. More respondents report
environmental values that align with the “dominant
social paradigm” than a more pro-environmental
perspective. Values and information are most
commonly cited as the dominant barrier to decision
making. Respondents tend toward strongly
positivistic views of science, generally think that
scientists should play a dominant role in policy
formation, and also tend to view themselves as more
Liberal than Conservative. There are slightly fewer
respondents with self-reported scientific expertise
than with nonscientific (Table 1).
Hypothesis 1:
Conflict persists because information sharing links
within the network do not span vertical, horizontal,
expertise, and/or ideological boundaries.
Using both joint-count contingency analysis and a
structural-block model (ANOVA), there are no
significant differences between within-group and
across-group network ties because of H1a vertical
stratification or H1b horizontal stratification (Table
2). However, there are some significant differences
in the frequency of within- and between-group ties
related to H1c ideological differences. Although
there are no significant differences in the joint-count
contingency analysis and a structural-block model
(ANOVA) by: (1) environmental values or
perspectives on (2) barriers to decision making,
pairwise comparisons of (3) science as positivism,
(4) scientists as advocates for policy, and (5)
political view were significant (Table 2). These
include significantly higher rates of information
sharing from ecocentrists to the dominant social
paradigm (Table 3) and from those with
Conservative political views to more Liberal
respondents (Table 3). When examining H1d
expertise, the frequency of scientists acknowledging
information sharing with nonscientists is lower than
expected by chance (Table 3).
Hypothesis 2:
Conflict persists because power in the network is
unevenly distributed across vertical, horizontal,
expertise, and/or ideological barriers.
Betweenness (H2a) and degree (H2b) centrality are
significantly different for those who think of
scientists as policy advocates and those who do not
(betweenness centrality F: 1.647 df: 19, p: 0.044;
degree centrality F: 2.767 df: 14, p: 0.005).
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Fig. 4. Map of network connections indicated by respondents.

Note: Ties represent reported information sharing “at least monthly.” Node shape represents expertise
types (triangle = unable to identify, square = nonscientist, circle = scientist). Node shade represents
environmental values (no fill = nonrespondent, gray = pro-environmental, black = business as usual).
Node label indicates political views (0 = nonrespondent, 1 = Liberal, 2 = Conservative).

Discussion of Results and Directions for Future
Research
In many ways, the VRBP social network structure
does not interfere with the general-process goals
outlined in the academic literature for successful
ecosystem and water resource management by
facilitating information flow (Schneider et al. 2003,

Bulkeley 2005, Lebel 2005, Cash et al. 2006).
Although the low density of ties across the whole
network indicates that there is space for conflict to
persist, tests for homophily indicate that members
of the VRBP interact across most of the perspectives
outlined in our hypotheses. No strong cliques
emerge to reinforce communication within one
perspective at the expense of communication across
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Table 1. Frequency of independent variables for Hypotheses H1a–H1d.

Frequency

Percent

cities

6

14.29

county

5

11.90

watershed

9

21.43

state

2

4.76

nation

7

16.67

tribal

1

2.38

unknown

2

4.76

missing

10

23.81

downstream

20

47.62

upstream

10

23.81

tribal

1

2.38

unsure

3

7.14

missing

8

19.05

pro-environmental

20

47.62

dominant social paradigm

9

21.43

missing

13

30.95

weakly positivist

6

14.29

strongly positivist

23

54.76

missing

13

30.95

nonadvocate

13

30.95

advocate

17

40.48

missing

12

28.57

H1a: vertical

H1b: horizontal

H1c (i): environmental values

H1c (ii): science attitudes

H1c (iii): scientist attitudes

(con'd)
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H1c (iv): political ideology
Liberal

19

45.24

Conservative

7

16.67

missing

16

38.10

trust

2

4.76

resolution process

3

7.14

management

1

2.38

legislation

5

11.90

information

7

16.67

values

11

26.19

missing

13

30.95

nonscientist

17

40.48

scientist

11

26.19

missing

14

33.33

H1c (v): barriers

H1d: expertise

Note: Schneider et al. (2003) relate vertical position to levels of government,
horizontal position to geographic jurisdiction, expertise position to scientific
training, and ideological position to views underlying issue positions. Vertical,
horizontal, and expertise codes were coded by researchers using definitions derived
from these criteria. The worldview component draws from previously validated
survey questions. These include scales developed to assess 3a) environmental
values (Dunlap et al. 2000), 3b) science attitudes, 3c) the role of scientists in policy
formation (Steel et al. 2004), 3d) political ideology (General Social Survey 2006),
and 3e) perceptions of dominant barriers to achieving the VRBP’s objectives
(Marshall et al. 2007).

perspectives, a characteristic more common in
networks with dense connections and/or homogenous
perspectives (Rowley 1997). However, there are
observable patterns in the effort individuals exert to
communicate across perspectives and the likelihood
of some perspectives to occupy central positions in
the network. Differences in ties between those with
pro-environmental views and others ascribing to the
dominant social paradigm indicate that proenvironmental members are spending more effort
interacting with those of the dominant social

paradigm than with other pro-environmental
members. This might be explained by a perception
that the dominant social paradigm view has more
information to share and/or influence in outside
decision-making bodies or that the proenvironmental groups perceive their perspective as
underacknowledged and therefore feel a need to
actively spread information. In terms of political
ideologies, this relationship is driven primarily by
the frequency with which Conservatives tie to
Liberals, which is probably partially driven by the
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Table 2. Tests for respondent attribute affilliation with tie frequency across and within horizonal and vertical
scope, worldview characteristic (environmental values, science attitudes, scientist attitudes, political
ideology, and barriers to decision making), and expertise type.

Joint-count contingency analysis

Structural-block
model

Chi-square

Significance

R-square probablility

Number of
comparisons
(significant)

H1a: horizontal

91.32

0.26

0.74

25(0)

H1b: vertical

33.44

0.38

--

--

H1c (i): environmental values

42.33

0.05

0.13

9(1)

H1c (ii): science attitudes

20.96

0.19

0.48

9(0)

H1c (iii): scientist attitudes

13.07

0.47

0.73

9(0)

H1c (iv): political ideology

43.45

0.05

0.11

9(1)

H1c (v): barrier

86.97

0.10

0.09

49(0)

H1d: expertise

17.90

0.34

0.59

9(1)

Note: Schneider et al. (2003) relate vertical position to levels of government, horizontal position to
geographic jurisdiction, expertise position to scientific training, and ideological position to views
underlying issue positions. Vertical, horizontal, and expertise codes were coded by researchers using
definitions derived from these criteria. The worldview component draws from previously validated
survey questions. These include scales developed to assess H1c (i) environmental values (Dunlap et al.
2000), H1c (ii) science attitudes, H1c (iii) the role of scientists in policy formation (Steel et al. 2004),
H1c (iv) political ideology (General Social Survey 2006), and H1c (v) perceptions of dominant barriers
to achieving the VRBP’s objectives (Marshall et al. 2007).

unequal sample size. Conservatives are also more
likely to tie to those with Liberal ideologies than to
other Conservatives or than Liberals are likely to tie
to each other.
A lack of ties among those who report scientific
expertise and those who do not, and power
asymmetries in this network, represent potential
barriers to achieving the VRBP’s mandate to
develop science-based management options for the
region. We were expecting more interaction
between scientific “experts” and “nonexperts”
within the VRBP, given the amount of media
attention afforded to the science, and previous
observations that scientific studies are used in very

political ways (Bolin et al. 2008). The structure of
the network also indicates that the structure of
interactions is constrained by the inequitable
distribution of power across views about the role of
scientists in policy, that is, those believing scientists
should make policy decisions have higher
betweenness and degree centrality. Together, these
results indicate that the VRBP may not be
functioning to allow reciprocal interaction among
“experts” and “nonexperts” necessary to achieve a
space in which scientific information is transparent,
shared, and deliberated. It also indicates that there
may differences within the group as to what the role
of science should be in policy making.

Ecology and Society 15(3): 22
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/

Table 3. Network autocorrelation with variables with significant pairwise comparisons.

Structural-block
model
Standard Significacoefficient
nce

Model fit
Greater/fewer ties†

H1c (i):
Environmental values
nonresponse to

nonresponse

0.001

0.09

+

nonresponse to

dominant social
paradigm

-0.03

0.07

+

nonresponse to

ecocentrist

-0.02

0.09

+

dominant social
paradigm to

nonresponse

0.06

0.10

-

dominant social
paradigm to

dominant social
paradigm

0.04

0.31

-

dominant social
paradigm to

ecocentrist

0.12

0.14

-

ecocentrist to

nonresponse

-0.01

0.13

+

ecocentrist to

dominant social
paradigm

-0.09

0.02

+

ecocentrist to

ecocentrist (intercept)

0

0.10

+

H1c (iv): Political
ideology
nonresponse to

nonresponse

-0.04

0.26

-

nonresponse to

Liberal

-0.04

0.28

-

nonresponse to

Conservative

-0.04

0.21

-

Liberal to

nonresponse

0

0.43

-

Liberal to

Liberal

0.02

0.43

+

Liberal to

Conservative

-0.02

0.32

-

Conservative to

nonresponse

0.04

0.14

-

Conservative to

Liberal

0.11

0.00

+

Conservative to

Conservative
(intercept)

0

0.49

+

N

Adjust- Probability
ed Rsquare

2070 0.018

0.129

2070 0.019

0.111

(con'd)
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H1d: Expertise

2070 0.006

nonresponse to

nonresponse

-0.08

0.09

+

nonresponse to

nonscientist

-0.11

0.07

+

nonresponse to

scientist

-0.07

0.09

+

nonscientists to

nonresponse

-0.08

0.10

+

non-scientists to

nonscientist

-0.03

0.31

+

nonscientists to

scientist

-0.06

0.14

+

scientist to

nonresponse

-0.03

0.13

+

scientist to

nonscientist

-0.09

0.02

-

scientist to

scientist (intercept)

0.00

0.10

-

0.59

Note: Bold typeface denotes a significant relationship.
† Greater ties than expected = (+); fewer ties than expected = (-).

Although some research finds that conflict can
sustain creativity, learning, and diversity in
knowledge systems (Jehn et al. 1999), the policy
literature generally suggests that minimizing
conflict is best to reach mutually agreeable goals.
From this perspective, the current shortcomings in
the VRBP might be explained by its very short
existence, and it is possible that, over time, the
degree of conflict within the network might decline
(e.g., Tilt et al. 2008). There are numerous examples
of attempts at collaborative management that have
taken longer, or failed altogether , because of
different stakeholder perspectives about the proper
role of science in policy making (see, for example,
the politics of science that stalled progress in the
Klamath River Basin in the Northwest U.S.;
Brunner and Steelman 2005). Collaborations that
have acknowledged the limits of scientific
information as a source of indisputable facts, and
that value local or native knowledge, have been
more successful (Tilt et al. 2008). For instance, the
Upper San Pedro Partnership found that a jointlearning effort in which participants share an
understanding of the goals and the use of the science,
and at the same time recognize that science will not
guarantee resolution of conflicts, has been
instrumental to their science-based approach
(Saliba and Jacobs 2007).

The finding that ideological ties, that is,
environmental and political orientation, vary within
the network, is not surprising given the history
underlying the founding of the VRBP and its
relatively short and tumultuous tenure as a
collaborative partnership. However, none of the
studies previously mentioned have analyzed the
structural relationship between powerful network
positions and beliefs toward the role of science.
Through this quantitative network analysis, we have
been able to specifically identify where the power
asymmetries in this partnership lie and what ideas
or beliefs underlie that position. A structural
approach allows for investigation of the barriers that
come about because of the location of conflict
within a group, rather than treating conflict as a
binary and merely assessing its presence or absence
within groups. The willingness of central actors, or
brokers, to share views that disagree with their own
perspective could be a large barrier to meeting the
target outcomes of the VRBP. Central actors play a
key role in fostering leadership, developing a shared
knowledge, and motivating creativity in natural
resource management (Bodin et al. 2006). They
have access to, and can synthesize across, a large
knowledge pool. On the other hand, if central
members choose to exploit asymmetries in the
network to advance their personal views, this can
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affect the group’s ability to find common ground
and define problems (Choo Wei 2007, Manring
2007). Research on social learning has shown that
relying on these contexts is often perceived as a
limitation to social learning because their inclusion
does not lead to transformative change or present
opportunities for creativity (e.g., Prell et al. 2008).
The implication for the VRBP is that although the
central actors’ belief that scientists should serve as
advocates in the policy process is consistent with
the mission of the VRBP, it does not appear to be a
view widely shared with the rest of the group. Not
only could this view of science affect a number of
the scientific and information-gathering functions
of the partnership, such as how boundaries outside
of the VRBP are spanned, whether the definition of
research agenda is done or not done jointly, or if one
methodological strategy is followed instead of
testing a range of assumptions and hypotheses
shared by nonexperts in the group (Manring 2007).
The ideological differences between central and
peripheral network actors might indicate deeper
normative or epistemological differences of opinion
among participants as to what role science should
be playing in addressing water conflict in the
regions. We have started to investigate this issue by
further analyzing VRBP participants’ beliefs about
science and the role of science, and relating this to
a qualitative analysis of how the conflict in the
region is perceived and framed (Neff et al. 2008).
We acknowledge that the ultimate success of a
watershed partnership, or any form of collaborative
management, needs to be evaluated through longterm analysis of both its process and social–
ecological outcomes (Conley and Moote 2003,
Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2007), as well as how well it
meets stated policy goals. As such, the results
presented here should not be interpreted as an
evaluation of the success or failure of the VRBP but,
rather, as an assessment of conditions that may
promote or inhibit collaboration and their goals of
science-based management. Given the short time
span of the VRBP, we have observed that the
partnership’s information network and its ability to
span multiple boundaries is conducive to
collaboration, but that differences in structural
positions between science “experts” and other
members, as well as between central actors and the
rest of the network, could inhibit collaboration and
the success of the VRBP in the future. These barriers
to more successful collaboration would not have
come to light through any assessment of
collaboration that either focused solely on
individuals or the structure of the network.

CONCLUSION
Understanding the factors that promote collaboration
in natural resource management is no simple task.
The approach we have presented here provides a
much different picture of the nature of conflict that
permeates this Arizona watershed partnership.
Neither the depictions in media sources that claim
that there is not enough science, nor the perceptions
of VRBP members who most commonly list values
as the dominant barrier to VRBP success,
adequately capture the complexity of water resource
management in this case. Our research highlights
the crucial role that perspectives about science and
expertise can have in the way that information flows
through the VRBP and, ultimately, what knowledge
is produced and accepted by its stakeholders. This
area has been greatly overlooked in the
collaborative-management literature. In ongoing
projects, we are using qualitative methods to further
understand the role that science and expertise play
in framing water-management issues in the region.
We hope that our work stimulates even more
attention from the collaboration and organizationalresearch community to examine the role of
knowledge systems in the effectiveness of
partnerships.
We consider the structural approach presented here,
paired with perspectives and beliefs as attributes of
the individuals in the network, valuable to the
research and practice of collaborative natural
resource management. Although the analyses used
here are unlikely to provide prescriptive parameters
for future watershed partnerships, using this method
widely might provide insight into general
characteristics that describe partnerships that are
able to meet their stated objectives and those that
are not. Understanding the structural relationships
within partnerships can also help determine how
groups can build adaptive capacity and resilience as
a result of collaboration (Bodin et al. 2006, Janssen
et al. 2006). Most importantly, we hope to have
demonstrated the added value of incorporating
belief attributes to analyze perceptual sources of
conflict along with relational. As this case
demonstrated, information sharing is not a useful
proxy for understanding conflict without also taking
into account the political and cultural context of the
partnership. Future research should move beyond a
solely structural or individual approach and toward
a more integrated approach to identify barriers and
opportunities to collaborative management.
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Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/
responses/

Acknowledgments:
We are grateful to Bill Edwards of the Decision
Center for a Desert City (DCDC), Arizona State
University, for his help in conducting the survey for
this research. We would also like to thank Timothy
W. Collins and Arizona State Senator Tom
O’Halleran for their valuable input in the early
formulations of this research. This material is based
on work supported by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. SES-0345945,
Decision Center for a Desert City (DCDC) and
Grant No. 0504248, National Science Foundation
Integrated Graduate Education Research and
Training (IGERT) in Urban Ecology. Any opinions,
findings and conclusions expressed in this material
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Science Foundation
(NSF).

LITERATURE CITED
Armitage, D. 2005. Adaptive capacity and
community-based natural resource management.
Environmental Management 35:703–715.

Borgatti, S., M. G. Everett, and L. C. Freeman.
2002. UCINET for windows: software for social
network analysis. Analytic Technologies, Harvard,
Massachussetts, USA.
Brass, D. J., and M. E. Burkhardt. 1993. Potential
power and power use: an investigation of structure
and behavior. Academy of Management Journal 36
(3):441–470.
Brass, D. J., J. Galaskiewicz, H. R. Greve, and
W. P. Tsai. 2004. Taking stock of networks and
organizations: a multilevel perspective. Academy of
Management Journal 47(6):795–817.
Browning-Aiken, A., H. Richter, D. Goodrich, B.
Strain, and R. Varady. 2004. Upper San Pedro
Basin: fostering collaborative bi-national watershed
management. Water Resource Development 20
(3):353–376.
Brunner, R. D., and T. D. Steelman, editors. 2005.
Adaptive governance: integrating science, policy
and decision making. Columbia University Press,
New York, New York, USA.
Bulkeley, H. 2005. Reconfiguring environmental
governance: towards a politics of scales and
networks. Political Geography 24:875–902.

Barks, C. 2007. Holt: Big Chino pipeline on track.
Prescott Daily Courier. 14 February 2007. Prescott,
Arizona, USA.

Cash, D. W., W. Adger, F. Berkes, P. Garden, L.
Lebel, P. Olsson, L. Pritchard, and O. Young.
2006. Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance
and information in a multilevel world. Ecology and
Society 11(2): 8. [online] URL: http://www.ecology
andsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/.

Berardo, R. 2009. Processing complexity in
networks: a study of informal collaboration and its
effect on organizational success. Policy Studies
Journal 37(3):521–539.

Chan K., and J. Liebowitz. 2006. The synergy of
social network analysis and knowledge mapping: a
case study. International Journal of Management
and Decision Making 7 (1):19–35.

Bodin, Ö., B. Crona, and H. Ernstson. 2006.
Social networks in natural resource management:
what is there to learn from a structural perspective?
Ecology and Society 11(2): r2. [online] URL: http:/
/www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/resp2/.

Choo Wei, C. 2007. Information seeking in
organizations: epistemic contexts and contests.
Information Research 12(2):298. [online] URL:htt
p://InformationR.net/ir/12-2/paper298.html.

Bolin, B., T. Collins, and K. Darby. 2008. Fate of
the Verde: water, environmental conflict, and the
politics of scale in Arizona's central highlands.
Geoforum 39(3):1494–1511.

Collins, T. W., and B. Bolin. 2007. Characterizing
vulnerability to water scarcity: the case of a
groundwater-dependent, rapidly urbanizing region.
Environmental Hazards 7:399–418.

Ecology and Society 15(3): 22
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/

Conley, A., and M. A. Moote. 2003. Evaluating
collaborative natural resource management. Society
and Natural Resources 16(5):371–386.

Hirt, P., A. Gustafson, and K. L. Larson. 2008.
The mirage in the valley of the sun. Environmental
History 13:482–514.

Cortner, H. J., and M. A. Moote. 1999. The politics
of ecosystem management. Island Press, Washington,
D.C., USA.

Ibarra, H. 1993. Network centrality, power, and
innovation involvement: determinants of technical
and administrative roles. The Academy of
Management Journal 36(3):471–501.

Costenbader, E., and T. W. Valente. 2003. The
stability of centrality measures when networks are
sampled. Social Networks 25:283–307.
Davy, D. 2006. Recipients: the key to information
transfer. Knowledge Management Research and
Practice 4:17–25.

Janssen, M. A., Ö. Bodin, J. M. Anderies, T.
Elmqvist, H. Ernstson, R. R. J. McAllister, P.
Olsson, and P. Ryan. 2006. A network perspective
on the resilience of social–ecological systems.
Ecology and Society 11(1): 15. [online] URL: http:
//www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art15/.

Dillman, D. A.. 2000. Mail and internet surveys:
the tailored design method. Second edition. Wiley,
New York, New York, USA.

Jasanoff, S. 1990. The fifth branch: science
advisers as policy makers. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, USA.

Dunlap, R. E., K. D. Van Liere, A. G. Mertig, and
R. E. Jones. 2000. Measuring endorsement of the
new ecological paradigm: a revised NEP scale.
Journal of Social Issues 56(3):425–442.

Jehn, K. A., G. B. Northcraft, and M. A. Neale.
1999. Why differences make a difference: a field
study of diversity, conflict, and performance in
workgroups. Administrative Science Quarterly 44
(4):741.

Galaskiewicz, J. 1985. Interorganizational relations.
Annual Review of Sociology 11:281–304. Annual
Reviews, Palo Alto, California, USA.
General Social Survey. 2006. GSS Questionnaires.
National Data Program for the Sciences, University
of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, USA. [online]
URL:http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/Publications/
GSS+Questionnaires/.
Gunther, A. C., and J. D. Storey. 2003. The
influence of presumed influence. Journal of
Communication 53(2):199–215.
Hanneman, R. A., and M. Riddle. 2005.
Introduction to social network methods. University
of California, Riverside, California, USA.

Jenkins, M. 2006. The perpetual growth machine.
High Country News. 12 June 2006. Paonia,
Colorado, USA.
Knoke, D., and R. S. Burt. 1983. Prominence.
Pages 195–222 in Burt, R. S., and M. J. Minor.
Applied network analysis. Sage Publications,
Beverly Hills, California, USA.
Koontz, T., T. A. Steelman, J. Carmin, K. S.
Korfmacher, C. Moseley, and C. W. Thomas.
2004. Collaborative environmental management:
what roles for government? Resources for the
Future, Washington, D.C., USA.
Krackhardt, D. 1987. Cognitive social structures.
Social Networks 9:109–134.

Hardy, C., N. Phillips, and T. B. Lawrence. 2003.
Resources, knowledge and influence: the
organizational effects of interorganizational
collaboration. Journal of Management Studies 40
(2):321–347.

Krackhardt, D., and R. Stern. 1988. Information
networks and organizational crises: an experimental
simulation. Social Psychology Quarterly 51
(2):123–140.

Henry, A. 2007. Ideology versus power as drivers
of network cohesion: the case of regional planning.
Maxwell Workshop on Organizations and the
Natural Environment. 22–24 May, 2007. Syracuse,
New York, USA.

Langenheim, V. E., E. DeWitt, and L. Wirt. 2005.
Preliminary geophysical framework of the Upper
and Middle Verde River Watershed, Yavapai County,
Arizona. Open-File Report. U.S. Geological
Survey, Reston, Virginia, USA. 2005–1154.

Ecology and Society 15(3): 22
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/

Leach, W. D., and N. W. Pelkey. 2001. Making
watershed partnerships work: a review of the
empirical literature. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management November/December
2001:378–385.
Lebel, L., P. Garden, and M. Imamura. 2005. The
politics of scale, position, and place in the
governance of water resources in the Mekong
region. Ecology and Society 10(2): 18. [online]
URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/
art18/.
Lubell, M., M. Schneider, J. T. Scholz, and M.
Mete. 2002. Watershed partnerships and the
emergence of collective action institutions.
American Journal of Political Science 46(1):148–
163.
Manring, S. L. 2007. Creating and managing
interorganizational learning networks to achieve
sustainable ecosystem management. Organization
and Environment 20(3):325–346.
Marsden, P. V. 1990. Network data and
measurement. Annual Review of Sociology 16:435–
463.
Marshall, K., R. White, and A. Fischer. 2007.
Conflicts between humans over wildlife management:
on the diversity of stakeholder attitudes and
implications for conflict management. Biodiversity
and Conservation 16(11):3129–3146.
McGavock, E. 2003. Big Chino aquifers: knowns,
unknowns, and conflicting interpretations. Tri-City
Water Forum, Prescott, Arizona, USA.
Moreland, R., L., and A. R. Krishnan. 1996.
Socially shared cognition at work: transactive
memory and group performance. Pages 57–85 in J.
Nye, and A. Brower, editors. What’s social about
social cognition. Sage Publications, Thousand
Oaks, California, USA.
Muñoz-Erickson, T. A., B. Aguilar-González,
and T. D. Sisk. 2007. Linking ecosystem health
indicators and collaborative management: a
systematic framework to evaluate ecological and
social outcomes. Ecology and Society 12(2): 6.
[online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/
iss2/art6/.

Neff, M., B. Bolin, B. Cutts, K. Darby, L. Larson,
T. A. Muñoz-Erickson, and A. Wutich. 2008.
Does truth flow like water? The role of social
networks in the flow of scientific understandings in
a water management controversy. Association of
American Geographers, Washington, D.C., USA.
Northern Arizona Land Exchange and Verde
River Basin Partnership Act. 2005. Public Law
109–110. United States Statues at Large, 199 Stat.
2351–2362.
Olsson, P., C. Folke, and T. Hahn. 2004. Social–
ecological transformation for ecosystem management:
the development of adaptive co-management of a
wetland landscape in southern Sweden. Ecology
and Society 9(4): 2. [online] URL: http://www.ecol
ogyandsociety.org/vol9/iss4/art2.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the
evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets,
USA.
Pahl-Wostl, C., M. Craps, A. Dewulf, E. Mostert,
D. Tabara, and T. Taillieu. 2007. Social learning
and water resources management. Ecology and
Society 12(2): 5. [online] URL: http://www.ecology
andsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art5/.
Prell, C., K. Hubacek, C. Quinn, and M. Reed.
2008. “Who’s in the network?” When stakeholders
influence data analysis. Systemic Practice and
Action Research 21(6): 443–458
Provan, K. G., A. Fish, and J. Sydow. 2007.
Interorganizational networks at the network level:
a review of the empirical literature on whole
networks. Journal of Management 33(3):479–516.
Provan, K. G., and H. B. Milward, 1995. A
preliminary theory of interorganizational network
effectiveness: a comparative study of four
community mental-health systems. Administrative
Science Quarterly 40(1):1–33.
Reagans, R., and E. W. Zuckerman. 2001.
Networks, diversity, and productivity: the social
capital of corporate research and development
teams. Organization Science 12:502–517

Ecology and Society 15(3): 22
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/

Reisner, M. 1993. Cadillac desert: the American
west and its disappearing water. Second edition.
Penguin, New York, New York, USA.

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts,
USA.

Rowley, T. J. 1997. Moving beyond dyadic ties: a
network theory of stakeholder influences. Academy
of Management Review 22(4):887–910.

Wegner, D. M. 1987. Transactive memory: a
contemporary analysis of the group mind. Pages
185–208 in B. Mullen and G. R. Goethals, editors.
Theories of group behavior. Springer, New York,
New York, USA.

Rulke, D., and J. Galaskiewicz. 2000. Distribution
of knowledge, group network structure, and group
performance. Management Science 46(5):612–625.
Sabatier, P. A., W. Focht, M. Lubell, Z.
Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, and M. Matlock. 2005.
Collaborative approaches to watershed management.
Pages 3–21 in P. A. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubell,
Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, and M. Matlock,
editors. Swimming upstream: collaborative approaches
to watershed management. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA.
Schneider, M., J. Scholz, M. Lubell, D. Mindruta,
and M. Edwardsen. 2003. Building consensual
institutions: networks and the national estuary
program. American Journal of Political Science 47
(1):143–158.
Shutters, S. T., and B. B. Cutts. 2008. A simulation
model of cultural consensus and persistent conflict.
Pages 71–78 in V. S. Subrahamanian, and A.
Kruglanski, editors. Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Computational
Cultural Dynamics. AAAI Press, Menlo Park,
California, USA.
SPSS Inc. 2001. SPSS Base 15.0 for Windows
User's Guide. SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Steel, B., P. List, D. Lach, and B. Shindler. 2004.
The role of scientists in the environmental policy
process: a case study from the American West.
Environmental Science and Policy. 7:1–13.
Tilt, W., C. Conley, M. James, J. C. Lynn, T. A.
Muñoz-Erickson, and P. Warren. 2008. Creating
successful collaborations in the West: lessons from
the field. Pages 1–23 in C. Van Riper III, and M.
Sogee, editors. The Colorado Plateau III:
integrating research and resources management for
effective conservation. University of Arizona Press,
Tucson, Arizona, USA.
Wasserman, S., and K. Faust. 1994. Social
network analysis: methods and applications.

Wirt, L., E. DeWitt, and V. Langenheim. 2004.
Geologic framework of aquifer units and
groundwater flowpaths, Verde River headwaters,
North-Central Arizona. Open File Report 2004–
1411. U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia,
USA. [online] URL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2004/1
411/.
Wondolleck, J. M., and S. L. Yaffee. 2000. Making
collaboration work: lessons from innovation in
natural resource management. Island Press,
Washington, D.C., USA.
Worster, D. 1985. Rivers of empire: water, aridity,
and the growth of the American west. Pantheon,
New York, New York, USA.

Ecology and Society 15(3): 22
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art22/

APPENDIX 1. Survey questions.
Q2. Which organizations or governmental entities interested in the Big Chino Water Project are you affiliated with?
Q4. Please check all roles that describe your participation in the proposed Big Chino Water Project: Activist, Business Owner, Concerned
Citizen, Consultant, Elected Official, Engineer, Outdoor Recreationalist, Policy Maker, Scientist, Water Manager, Other.
Q6. Please rate how well you agree with each of the statements below. Scale for the question: Strongly Disagree, Slightly Disagree,
Neutral, Slightly Agree, Strongly Agree.
Statements:
A. Use of the scientific method is the only certain way to determine what is true or false about the world.
B. The advance of knowledge is a linear process driven by key experiments.
C. Science provides objective knowledge about the world.
D. It is possible to eliminate values and value judgments from the interpretation of scientific data.
E. Facts describe true states of affairs about the worlds.
F. Scientists should only report scientific results and leave others to make natural resource management decisions.
G. Scientists should report scientific results and then interpret the results for others involved in natural resource decision making.
H. Scientists should work closely with managers and others to integrate scientific results in natural resource decision making.
I. Scientists should be responsible for making decisions about natural resource management
Q9. Please rate how well you agree with each of the statements below. Scale for the question: Strongly Disagree, Slightly Disagree,
Neutral, Slightly Agree, Strongly Agree.
Statements:
A. We are approaching the limit to the number of people the earth can support.
B. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.
C. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.
D. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.
E. Human ingenuity will ensure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable.
F. Humans are severely abusing the environment.
G. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.
H. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.
I.The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
J. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature.
K. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has generally been greatly exaggerated.
L. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.
M. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.
N. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
O. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.
P. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.
Q10. How frequently do you interact with each of the following people concerning the Big Chino Water Project? Interaction can occur
through face to face contact, presentations, meetings, through mail, email, telephone, fax, or websites (when the author can be identified).
Please include interactions already described above, as well. [Names not included for confidentiality purposes].
Q12. We hear a lot of talk these days about Liberals and Conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely Liberal--point 1--to extremely Conservative-- point 7. Where would you place
yourself on this scale?

